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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE. 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL D ECISION N OTICE 






Appearanc~s: Cheryl Kates Esq. 
P.O. Box 734 
. Fairport, New York 14450 
Decision appealed: June 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of.24 months .. 
Board Member(s) Berliner, Alexander 
who participated: 
. Papers corisi<l:ered: Appellant's Letter~briefreceived September 19, 2019 
Appellant's Supplemental Letter-brief received De~ember 11, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review·: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Reco~endation · 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation-Report, Parole Board Report, Interv.iew Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instru~ent, Offender Case 
"Plan. 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ M odified to ___ _ 
_&.rrried _ ·v acated, remanded for de novo interv.iew _ Modified to - --"-'----
./ 
Affirmed _. _ Vacated, r emanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ·----
If the • al Determination is at vari.ance with Findings and Rec9mmendation of Appeals° Unit,. written 
r easons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final D~term.ination, the rel~ted Statement of the Appeals U~t's Finding~ and the separate findi/¥'of 
the· Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate' s Counsel, if any, on ~LJ/at>J.o ~ . . 
Distribution; Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - fosf. Parole File - Central File . 
P -2002(B) (11/2018) 
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   Appellant challenges the June 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 
24-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved her driving a car while in an intoxicated 
condition and on strong medications, and causing a car accident which killed the other driver. 
Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational 
bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required 
statutory factors. 2) the Board ignored her EEC and its presumption of release. 3) the decision 
lacks detail. 4) not all documents submitted were reviewed by the Board on the record. 5) much of 
the community opposition was based upon penal philosophy. 6) the decision was predetermined. 
7) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the mostly 
positive COMPAS has a presumption of release, but was ignored. And the COMPAS is not the 
correct instrument in this type of case, but rather a SASSI is. And, the statutes are now evidence 
and rehabilitation based. 8) the 24 month hold is excessive. 
 
   Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the 
specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  
People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a 
finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the 
welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 
771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  While 
consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
   Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not 
be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017);  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
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   The Board may acknowledge the senseless nature of the crime. Sanchez v Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 
1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 
880, 816 N.Y.S.2d 765  (3d Dept. 2006). 
   The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
   The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal 
behavior.  See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of 
Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 
N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 
A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).    
   The Board may cite an inmate’s prior history of irresponsible driving in its decision. Confoy v New 
York State Division of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept 1991); Wade v 
Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   The Board may take note of the inmate’s disregard for the life of another human being. Hakim v 
Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Angel v Travis, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 
N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). The Board may consider the inmate’s blatant disregard for the law and 
the sanctity of human life. Campbell v Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2nd Dept. 
2019). 
    The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Espinal v. New 
York Bd. of Parole, 2019 NY Slip Op 04080, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4057 (3d Dept. May 23, 
2019) (COMPAS instrument yielded mixed results); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 
50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance 
abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 
508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related 
crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 
(3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 
57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
   The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker 
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v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
   The Board may consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying 
parole.  See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). 
   Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole.  Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 
1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 
2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 
(3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). An EEC does not 
automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. 
Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the Board is not 
required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 
817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may deny release 
to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the 
inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not 
compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. 
Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). The Board acted within its discretion in determining other considerations 
rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this 
time.   See generally Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Neal v. 
Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Singh v. Evans, 107 
A.D.3d 1274, 1275, 968 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649-50 (3d Dept. 2013).   
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   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   As community opposition was not a part of the Board decision, it is not required to be placed on the 
record.  
   Everything submitted by appellant was reviewed by the Board. There is a presumption of honesty 
and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. 
Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The 
Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations.  
See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). There is no evidence the 
Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 
153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. 
of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). Nor was any penal philosophy 
discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its duty.  
See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d 
Dept. 1985). 
 
   Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
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N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.  
   Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).  
   There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that a favorable COMPAS instrument gives rise to a 
presumption of rehabilitation and release.  Since 1977, the Board has been required to apply the 
same three-part substantive standard. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  The 2011 amendments 
require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment principles to “assist” in measuring an 
inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release.  Executive Law § 259-c(4).  The 
statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and 
needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole release requiring the Board to provide 
countervailing evidence.  Indeed, while the Board might, for example, find an inmate sufficiently 
rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—that the inmate will “live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law,” the Board could also find, in its discretion, that the inmate’s 
release would be incompatible with the welfare of society or would unduly deprecate the 
seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly contradicts the inmate’s assertion 
that even uniformly low COMPAS scores create a presumption of release. See Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must 
weigh along with the statutory factors for purposes of deciding whether the three standards are 
satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1108; accord Matter of 
Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d at 1061. This is exactly what occurred here.   
 
   Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent a an evidentiary or rehabilitation/forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be 
the fundamental basis for release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of 
the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of 
any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration 
process.  In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and 
needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–
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c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of 
Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 
1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was 
never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs 
information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, 
the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case 
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The 
amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply 
when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
 
   The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory 
factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); 
accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The 
Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense.  See Matter of Montane v. 
Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo 
v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 
A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   Appellant argues COMPAS has limitations requiring consideration of special risk assessments 
when an inmate presents with a history of substance abuse.  However, there is no requirement that the 
Board consider additional risk assessments beyond the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of McCarthy v. 
New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Index No. 3664/18, Decision/Order/Judgment 
dated Oct. 18, 2018, at 3 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Ceresia, S.C.J.).  The COMPAS instrument simply 
suggests that in the case of inmates with elevated substance abuse scores, an additional assessment 
such as a Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (“SASSI”) might be useful upon release. 
   The Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the 
Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
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N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  In the absence 
of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed.   Matter of Tatta v. 
State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord 
Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 
2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 
months for discretionary release was excessive or improper. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
